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PAKISTAN, THE WTO, AND LABOR
REFORM
Asna Afzal*
Abstract: This Note examines the economic and legal implications of
developing nations’ membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Speciªcally, the article analyzes Pakistan’s labor reforms subsequent to its
membership in the WTO. The Note ªrst provides a historical background
of Pakistani membership in the WTO. Next, the Note discerns that despite
the lack of established WTO labor standards, developing nations face
pressure to implement labor reforms incidental to trade liberalization
policies. The author argues that the pressures imposed on lesser-devel-
oped countries (LDCs) such as Pakistan have, as of yet, spawned only
superªcial labor reforms. The ªnal section of the Note suggests that
whether or not the WTO chooses to set labor standards in the future,
international trade commitments must adequately account for the
economic and legal constraints of LDCs in order to spur lasting labor
reform.
Introduction
As a founding member of the World Trade Organization, Paki-
stan has faced a myriad of challenges stemming from its status as a
developing nation.1 Many of these challenges derive from the nation’s
substantial decline in economic growth in recent years.2 From 1997 to
2004, GDP growth remained below 6.0%.3 The country’s economic
struggles mirror the steady growth in poverty levels.4 Approximately
                                                                                                                     
* Asna Afzal is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Comparative Law
Review.
1 See generally Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Global Trade Negotiations
Home Page, Pakistan Summary (2004), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/gov/pak-
istangov.html [hereinafter Pakistan Summary].
2 See id.
3 Asian Dev. Bank, Asian Dev. Outlook 2005: Pakistan (2005), available at http://
www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2005/pak.asp.
4 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Congressional Budget Justiªcation—FY 2005:
Asia and the Near East: Pakistan (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/
budget/cbj2005/ane/pk.html.
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one-third of the nation’s 148 million people live below the poverty
line.5
In addition to poor economic health, Pakistan has confronted
other crises common among developing nations: political instability
and lack of transparency.6 Budgetary constraints, largely due to steep
military expenditures, further limit spending in the education and
health sectors.7
Pakistan has undertaken various reform measures in accordance
with its trade liberalization policies.8 While the WTO does not formally
incorporate labor standards in the obligations imposed upon members,
developing nations such as Pakistan face pressure to implement labor
reforms incidental to trade liberalization policies.9 For example, the
country has faced pressure to adopt internationally accepted wage and
safety requirements.10 Despite the impetus for labor reform underlying
many of Pakistan’s WTO obligations, however, the nation has encoun-
tered difªculty in enacting sustainable labor reforms.11
This Note analyzes the relationship between labor reform
sustainability and the constraints unique to Pakistan as a developing
nation member of the WTO. Part I introduces the WTO accession
process and discerns key reforms instituted by Pakistan pursuant to
WTO commitments, including pressures for labor reform that under-
lie trade liberalization. This section also highlights the current status
of labor standards enforcement on the WTO agenda. Part II describes
the labor reforms indirectly spawned by Pakistan’s implementation of
WTO commitments, and argues that they are superªcial due to the
constraints associated with developing nations. Finally, Part III sug-
gests that whether or not the WTO chooses to set labor standards in
the future, it must adequately consider the economic and legal con-
straints of LDCs in order to spur lasting labor reform.
                                                                                                                     
5 Id.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 See Pakistan Summary, supra note 1.
9 See Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Global Trade Negotiations Home Page,
Labor Summary (2004), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/gov/pakistangov.html [here-
inafter Labor Summary].
10 See Hammad Bashir, Opportunities of WTO Membership for Pakistan, Pak. & Gulf Econo-
mist, Jan. 5, 2004, available at http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/issue01/i&e2.htm.
11 Telephone Interview with Practicing Advocate, Punjab Province (Oct. 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Telephone Interview].
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I. Background
A. The Accession Process
Article XII of the WTO Agreement provides: “Any State or sepa-
rate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations . . . may accede to this Agreement, on
terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.”12
Pakistan was among the founding members of the WTO, estab-
lished in 1995.13 For non-founding members, the accession process be-
gins when the WTO General Council and the working party to the
Council approve a nation’s request.14 Next, the nation is required to
detail all elements of its trade and economic policy that have an impact
on WTO agreements.15 Upon resolution of fundamental policies, indi-
vidual WTO members begin bilateral negotiations with the prospective
member, determining the speciªc policies that will be agreed upon as a
precursor to membership. A member’s protocol consists of the negoti-
ated terms of membership.16 After completion of negotiations, the
working party ªnalizes the accession terms, which are then presented
to the WTO General Council for approval by member nations.17
B. Pakistan’s Membership in the WTO
The broad principles underlying Pakistan’s WTO membership
centered upon commitments that would position the nation to garner
maximum gains from free trade.18 In the international realm, Paki-
stan sought to further this goal through increased participation in a
global multilateral trading system; in the domestic arena, the nation
focused on promoting efªcient and competitive domestic production
activities.19 A key underlying aim of liberalization rested on the ability
                                                                                                                     
12 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. See generally World
Trade Org., How to Become a Member of the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter How to Become a Member].
13 Pakistan Summary, supra note 1.
14 How to Become a Member, supra note 12.
15 World Trade Organization, Membership, Alliances, and Bureaucracy, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [herein-
after Membership}.
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 See World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of Pakistan 12 (1995)
[hereinafter Trade Policy Review].
19 Id.
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of a free and competitive trade environment to spur social and eco-
nomic progress.20
Pursuant to the nation’s WTO membership, the following broad
goals were set forth for 1994/1995:
• Improve market access in goods: The nation set the stage for an in-
creasingly liberalized global economy resulting from the Uruguay
Round Agreements.21 To this end, Pakistan sought export growth,
by means of providing readily available access to raw materials,
inputs, and machinery.22
• Enhance transparency: In light of transparency and governance con-
cerns, Pakistan aimed to establish viable governance mechanisms,
thereby reducing administrative controls.23
• Reduce protection: Pakistan also agreed to reduce economic controls.
Through liberalization, the nation would derive growth from in-
creased reliance on market forces in lieu of economic control
mechanisms.24
• Advance technology: Pakistan committed itself to promoting the
growth of intellectual capital, speciªcally through expanding re-
search and development capabilities and human resource develop-
ment.25 Correspondingly, the nation agreed to promote the transfer
of technology into the country in support of industry di-
versiªcation.26
• Strengthen macro-economic policy: Pakistan agreed to set forth poli-
cies aimed at economic stability, in part through fostering consis-
tency in policy planning.27
C. Status of Labor Standards on WTO Agenda
Strictly speaking, the WTO has not established a multilateral
agreement on labor standards.28 Nonetheless, the establishment of
formal labor standards remains subject to extensive debate in the or-
                                                                                                                     
20 Id.
21 Id. The Uruguay Round Agreements spurred the ªrst major reform of the world’s
trading system since the inception of GATT, including key reforms in the dispute settle-
ment process and agreements to further liberalize the world trade regime.
22 Id.
23 See Trade Policy Review, supra note 18.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 13.
28LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 9.
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ganization.29 A 1996 Singapore Conference produced a Ministerial
Declaration stating that the WTO would collaborate with the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) to set forth and enforce core labor
standards (relating to issues such as child labor, wages, and discrimi-
nation) for WTO member nations.30 In the Conference’s concluding
remarks, however, the chairman noted that the declaration did not
put labor on the WTO agenda.31
Despite this ofªcial reservation, many developing nations assert
that labor concerns often provide their developed counterparts with an
excuse for protectionism.32 While neither the WTO’s current scheme
nor its predecessor (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, or
GATT) discern labor violations as a formal basis upon which trade bar-
riers can be erected against the accused country, developed nations
have invoked GATT provisions in support of sanctions against alleged
violators.33 Article XX is invoked by member governments to restrict
trade with a nation whose labor standards threaten “public morals” or
“human life and health.”34 Developed nations seeking sanctions against
their developing counterparts have also argued that inadequate labor
rights in export industries constitute “social dumping.”35
As such, developed nations, led by the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and Canada, assert that the WTO’s use of economic
sanctions is the only way to ensure that member nations abide by la-
bor standards.36 Developing nations counter that such sanctions rep-
resent a bid by developed members to undercut the comparative ad-
vantage of “cheaper labor” trading partners amidst increasingly liberal
capital markets.37 For example, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the
WTO, Munir Akram, argued that “the EU’s suggestions to bring labor
issues onto the [WTO] agenda have little to do with human rights and
                                                                                                                     
29 Brewster Grace, WTO Trade & Labor Standards, Foreign Policy In Focus, Apr. 26,
2000, at 1.
30World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, ¶ 4, WT/
MIN(96). See generally World Trade Organization, Labour Standards: Highly Controversial,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter Labour Standards].
31 Labour Standards, supra note 30.
32 BETSI BEEM & KIMBERELY MANNING, The WTO and Labor (1999),
http://www.washington.edu/wto/issues/labor.html.
33 LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 9.
34 See id; WTO Agreement, supra note 12.
35 Grace, supra note 29; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
36 LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 9.
37 Labour Standards, supra note 30.
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everything to do with attempts to keep out competing goods from
low-cost nations.”38
D. Underlying Pressures for Labor Reform
Though the WTO agenda does not directly encompass labor re-
form, developing nations often face pressure to abide by core labor
standards in connection with trade liberalization policies.39 For exam-
ple, with regard to market access in goods, Pakistan committed itself
to increasing export growth.40 In this arena, the nation has focused
speciªcally on the textile industry, its economic backbone.41 The in-
dustry serves as the source of employment for 38% of industrial work-
ers and generates a staggering proportion (60%) of foreign exchange
earnings.42 As such, the nation has attempted to boost textile exports
signiªcantly.43 Developed nation trading partners, interested in pro-
tecting their own industries, or weary of child labor and sweatshop
scandals, often seek assurances that the products are made in accor-
dance with standards accepted in their own nations.44
Similarly, amidst growing trade relationships spurred by WTO
membership, Pakistan faced pressure from trading partners related to
gender discrimination in the workplace.45 Given that women, a
signiªcant portion of the nation’s intellectual capital, lack signiªcant
legal protection in the workplace, Pakistani companies faced increas-
ing pressure to assure against discriminatory practices.46
The merits and role of the WTO in enforcing labor standards
remains a point of contention within the organization, and is a topic
beyond the scope of this Note’s analysis.47
                                                                                                                     
38 BEEM & MANNING, supra note 32.
39See, e.g., Labor Wages to be Revised After Every Three Years, Pak. News Service, Sept. 24,
2002, available at http://www.paknews.org/avantgo.php?news2=ºash1&id=2&date1=2002–
09–24 (on ªle with author).
40 See Trade Policy Review, supra note 18, at 12.
41 See Farzana Noshab, World Trade Organization: Critical Issues for Pakistan’s Agriculture and
Textile Industry, 2000, http://www.issi.org.pk/strategic_studies_htm/2000/no_4/article/
11a.htm.
42 See id.
43 See generally Trade Policy Review, supra note 18.
44 See Noshab, supra note 41, at 15.
45 See Labor Wages to be Revised After Every Three Years, supra note 39.
46 See id.
47 See Pakistan Summary, supra note 1.
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II. Discussion
A. Workplace Safety
Pursuant to WTO commitments regarding market access in goods,
Pakistan has sought export growth, particularly in the textile industry.48
During the period from 1974 to 1994, the Multi-Fibre Agreement
(MFA) governed bilateral agreements and allowed developed nations
to restrict textile imports from developing nations; in 1994, members
reached an agreement to phase out the MFA by 2005.49
While the phasing out of the MFA has expanded market access for
Pakistan in this sector, it simultaneously subjects key low-cost textile
producers, primarily developing nations heavily dependent on labor-
intensive industries, to increased competition from one another.50 This
increased competitive pressure is compounded by the fact that devel-
oped trading partners seek high-quality products, low turnaround
times, and assurances that the products conform to labor standards in
their own nations.51
The “credibility gap,” the perception that developing nation ex-
ports will not be on time or of high quality, marks a signiªcant handicap
for Pakistani exports.52 In an effort to maintain market share amidst
heightened competition, production objectives may override labor con-
cerns.53
Furthermore, the nation is ardently pushing for additional expan-
sion in this arena, as reºected in a policy report entitled “Textile Vision
2005.”54 The report outlines an ambitious goal for textile growth in the
post-MFA quota arena: propelling the nation from the world’s eighth
largest textile exporter ($4.9 billion) in 1998 to the ªfth largest in 2005
($13.8 billion).55
The pressure to remain proªtable in an intensely competitive
business environment gives rise to the risk that some textile mills may
purchase advanced machinery without providing the necessary train-
ing, and others may attempt to pack additional capacity into existing
                                                                                                                     
48 See Noshab, supra note 41.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See generally id.
52 See Noshab, supra note 41.
53 See generally id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
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infrastructure.56 In response to watchdog group concerns over ques-
tionable safety conditions and lack of union rights, new trading part-
ners and multinational companies voiced the desire for appropriate
regulations.57
Existing labor laws, such as The Factories Act of 1934 (the Facto-
ries Act), speciªcally §§ 27–33, indicate that measures must be taken
to ensure safety in the design, construction, maintenance, testing, and
inspection of machinery, tools, and equipment.58 While the Factories
Act in theory addressed the concerns of trading partners, much work
remains to be done in order to spur lasting change in workplace
safety conditions.59 A survey conducted by the Centre for the Im-
provement of Working Conditions and Environment (CIWCE) dis-
cerned major weaknesses in basic hygiene facilities, exhaust ªlters,
ªre prevention and medical facilities, emergency transport, waste dis-
posal services, and warning signs.60 Further, in the case of injury, fami-
lies who seek remedy under legislation such as the Factories Act lack
strong success rates, as courts tend to favor the employer due to lack
of proof of negligence.61 Thus, while WTO market access commit-
ments have spawned export growth, the incidental pressures for labor
reform from developed trading partners often take a secondary role
to production objectives.62
B. Transparency
Pakistan has also undertaken trade-related commitments in the
area of transparency, which often imply heightened monitoring of la-
bor conditions.63 To this end, the existence of labor laws such as the
Factories Act, which empowers authorities to monitor, suspend, restrict,
or prohibit work that poses a serious threat to worker safety, is notewor-
                                                                                                                     
56 See generally id.
57 See e.g., International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, To-
bacco and Allied Workers’ Association, Global Meeting of Coca-Cola Workers: Delegates Vow
to Continue Fight for Worker Rights, http://www.iuf.org.uk/cgi-bin/dbman/db.cgi?db=
default&uid=default&ID=747&view_records=1&ww=1&en=1 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
58 Labour Code of Pakistan (11th ed., Shaª 1986), available at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/cisdoc/cisdoc_legosh.view_record?p_mfn=47581&p_ctry=pak&p_lang=E (last vis-
ited Dec. 2, 2005).
59 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
60 University of Iowa College of Nursing, Occ. Health, http://www.occhealth
nursing.net/pakistanO.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
61 See id.
62 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
63 See generally Trade Policy Review, supra note 18.
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thy.64 Despite the presence of such legislation, however, potential re-
mains for substantially greater progress in the area of transparency.65 A
primary reason is that in developing nations, governance issues have
not reached a level of prominence comparable to that prevalent in the
developed world.66 As such, business owners as well as monitoring
authorities lack understanding of the purpose or implications of trans-
parency standards set forth pursuant to labor legislation.67
The problem is further magniªed by administrative complexity,
leading to arbitrary application of regulations.68 As one Pakistani
economist noted, “It is not uncommon that the attitude of govern-
ment functionaries towards the industry and business people is harsh.
Instead of helping them and guiding them to be in full compliance of
the prescribed requirement, they are reminded of the possibilities of
big ªnes and punishment . . . .”69
Additionally, business owners have voiced concerns regarding
inconsistent application.70 As a result, minimal incentives exist for
them to comply with transparency standards in the long term, inhibit-
ing the ability of external entities to monitor labor standards, as theo-
retically provided for in legislation such as the Factories Act.71
C. Gender Discrimination in the Workplace
Another key pressure Pakistan faced as a result of its WTO obliga-
tions stemmed from trading partners’ concerns over gender discrimi-
nation in national industries.72 In 1996, Pakistan ratiªed the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).73 CEDAW required the provision of effective remedies for
                                                                                                                     
64 See Int’l Lab. Org., supra note 58.
65 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
66 See id.
67 See Muhammad Bashir Chaudhry, Getting Ready for WTO Era Challenges, Pak. & Gulf
Economist, May 26, 2004, available at http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/
cover/c2003-30.asp.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
71 See Chaudhry, supra note 67.
72 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
73 See Seher Mir, Islamic Institute for Human Rights, Women in Pakistan, avail-
able at http://www.iifhr.com/womens%20website/ppsehermir.html (and on ªle with au-
thor); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
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any act of gender discrimination in the labor sector.74 The use of na-
tional legal machinery to fulªll CEDAW obligations is rendered
difªcult by the fact that the majority of the nation’s female labor force
participants are employed in the informal labor sector, which is ac-
corded minimal protection under national labor laws.75
Many Pakistani women are employed in menial positions in the
textile industry, often working up to 16 hours daily.76 Nonetheless, they
are typically classiªed by profession as homemakers and are thus
deemed to be outside the labor force.77 While domestic labor laws in
the textile sector encompass most labor management affairs, they do
not provide legal protection for the informal labor sector.78 Addition-
ally, Pakistani labor laws apply only to workplaces with more than ªfty
workers, further excluding the substantial contributions of women
through the informal labor sector.79 As a result, despite Pakistan’s
ratiªcation of the CEDAW in sprit, its substance has yet to be fulªlled in
practice.80
Typical working conditions in the informal labor sector include
irregular and low wages, vulnerability to sexual harassment, and
minimal job security.81 Such conditions not only lack legal redress, but
also lack statistical recognition.82 Since national labor statistics only
encompass the formal labor sector, the majority of female employ-
ment is excluded from national labor indicators.83
The lack of legal protection for women is compounded by the fact
that increasingly liberalized trade provides opportunity for expanding
companies to exploit the key sources of low cost labor, namely those
susceptible members of the work force who are unprotected by the
law.84 This is particularly problematic as the MFA is phased out, and
                                                                                                                     
74 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
75 See Rubina Jamil, Women and the Global Economy: The Case of Pakistan, Open
World Conference of Workers, http://www.owcinfo.org/owcnews/owcnews39.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2005).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See Huma Nawaz Syal, WTO and Working Conditions of Women in Pakistan, Sdpi Res. &
News Bull., Jan.-Feb. 2004, available at http://www.sdpi.org/help/research_and_news_
bulletin/nbjanfeb04/articles/WTO.htm.
79 Jamil, supra note 75.
80 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
81 Syal, supra note 78.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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multinational corporations gain greater freedom of movement between
nations in pursuit of cheap raw materials, the absence of trade union
rights, and low wages.85
D. Child Labor
Export expansion has also subjected Pakistan to pressure for child
labor reform, particularly in light of allegations that high-proªle multi-
national corporations have used child labor in Pakistani production
facilities.86 The nation’s developed trading partners, weary of child la-
bor scandals, sought assurances that exports were manufactured under
standards acceptable in their own nations.87 Though child labor inspec-
tions have risen in recent years pursuant to legislation such as the Em-
ployment of Children Act of 1991, data shows that child labor remains
under-prosecuted.88
In evaluating the Employment of Children Act’s success, it is in-
structive to examine the Pakistani soccer ball industry, which has been
investigated on several occasions for allegations of child labor viola-
tions.89 In 1996, 75% of the world’s soccer balls were produced in
Sialkot, Pakistan.90 A 1996 International Labor Organization study es-
timated that more than 7,000 children between the ages of ªve and
fourteen stitched balls on a full-time basis, and a signiªcant number
worked part-time.91
The dominant factor in the failure of child labor legislation lies in
lack of incentives for compliance, on the part of employers as well as
government ofªcials responsible for monitoring the industry.92 In or-
der to remain competitive with industrialized trading partners, develop-
ing nations must leverage their primary source of competitive advan-
tage: cheap, abundant labor.93 As Najanuddin Najmi, director general
                                                                                                                     
85 Id.
86 See e.g., American University, NIKE: Nike Shoes and Child Labor in Pakistan,
http://www.american.edu/TED/nike.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
87 See id.
88 Finnish Institute of Occ. Health, Child Labour in Pakistan—Issues, Policies
and Actions (2000), available at http://www.ttl.ª/Internet/English/Information/Elec-
tronic+journals/Asian-Paciªc+Newsletter/2000-02/07.htm.
89 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, Soccer Balls (2005),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/sweat4/soccer.htm.
90 Id.
91 Directorate of Labour Welfare and the Int’l Programme for the Elimina-
tion of Child Labour (IPEC), Child Labour in the Football Mfg. Indus. (1996).
92 See Jonathan Silvers, Child Labor in Pakistan, Atl. Monthly, Feb. 1996, at 79–92.
93 See id.
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of the government-sponsored Workers Education Program, notes:
“There’s little doubt that inexpensive child labor has fueled Pakistan’s
economic growth.”94
In addition to employers, government ofªcials lack incentive to
lend enforcement power to child labor legislation.95 Despite the fact
that government inspecting ofªcers received special training in the en-
forcement of child labor laws, empirical evidence shows inconsistent
inspections, prosecutions, and convictions.96 One author aptly com-
ments that: “[S]peaking ofªcially, [Pakistan’s leaders] deplore [child
labor] and have nothing but pity for the roughly 11 million children
working in factories, in ªelds, and on the streets. Speaking pragmati-
cally, they regard the practice as a distasteful but unavoidable part of an
emerging economy . . . .”97
This systemic lack of incentive to enforce child labor standards
lends credence to the argument that such stringent standards are un-
realistic in the context of developing nations.98 As Shabbir Jamal, ad-
visor to the Ministry of Labor, remarked: “Europeans addressed slav-
ery and child labor only after they became prosperous. Just as we are
catching up with the West in industrial development, so we are catch-
ing up in workplace and social reforms.”99 Additionally, the stringent
child labor standards advocated by Pakistan’s developed trading part-
ners ignore the underlying issue of poverty: high rates of adult unem-
ployment dictate the necessity of multiple household incomes.100
Given that labor-intensive sectors such as the textile and the soccer
ball industry are the backbone of the nation’s economy, there is little
institutional incentive to legitimately implement and enforce child la-
bor legislation, or other mechanisms that would signiªcantly hamper
the development of these sectors.101 As such, there is little incentive for
enforcement, and that which exists is geared primarily toward appeas-
ing developed trading partners.102 As the Human Rights Commission of
                                                                                                                     
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 See Dep’t of Lab. Punjab, Punjab Provincial Gov’t, Int’l and Nat’l Laws Re-
lated to Child Lab., available at http://www.dolpunjab.gov.pk/r2.htm (last visited Dec.
2, 2005).
97 Silvers, supra note 92.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See Kaushik Basu, Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives For Higher International
Labor Standards, 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 487, 495 (2001).
101 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
102 See Bureau of Int’l Lab. Aff., supra note 89.
2006] Pakistan, the WTO, and Labor Reform 119
Pakistan noted during a visit to Sialkot, manufacturers seemed to have
instructed their contractors not to talk about child labor, and had taken
the contractors to task “not so much for employing child labor as for
letting it become visible.”103 Such superªcial labor reforms are further
perpetuated by the lack of governmental personnel trained to monitor
and develop sound proactive policy regarding child labor.104
III. Analysis
The pressure faced by Pakistan to implement labor reforms inci-
dental to trade liberalization has spawned only superªcial labor re-
forms that cannot be sustained in the long term.105 In order to ªrmly
entrench these reforms, trade liberalization commitments must ade-
quately account for the economic and legal constraints of developing
nations.
A. Proposals for Pakistan
This Note proposes three mechanisms to further the develop-
ment of trade liberalization policies that adequately account for the
economic and legal constraints of developing nations and drive last-
ing labor reform.
Firstly, trade commitments should appropriately consider the es-
sential prerequisite for lasting legal reform: viable civil service infra-
structure capable of developing, implementing, and enforcing sound
labor policy.106 The success of legal reform depends largely on a con-
ducive institutional environment, which many developing nations such
as Pakistan have yet to develop.107 Building and modernizing institu-
tional capacity will lay the groundwork for sustainable labor reform,
allowing Pakistan to “‘speak the same trade . . . language’ as the rest of
the world.”108 One author, Dr. Abid Suleri, cites the inefªcient use of
resources in Pakistan’s current civil service structure, pointing out that
government employees who receive WTO training courses are often
                                                                                                                     
103 Id.
104 See Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
105 See id.
106 See Abid Qaiyum Suleri, A Field Not So Level, Int’l News (Pakistan), May 25, 2003,
available at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2003-weekly/nos-25-05-2003/spr.htm#4.
107 See generally Chaudhry, supra note 67.
108 Bashir, supra note 10.
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transferred among departments before they are able to develop a par-
ticular area of expertise.109
Dr. Suleri aptly suggests the development of a WTO cadre in the
Pakistani civil service structure, dedicated solely to WTO issues and in-
cluding representatives from the academic arena and the private sec-
tor.110 He also recommends government sponsorship of empirical re-
search on WTO-related reforms, which would provide valuable data on
the effectiveness of various mechanisms to enforce labor standards.111
In addition to minimizing arbitrary interpretation and applica-
tion of laws, strong institutional bases will counteract inconsistent ap-
plication and misuse of enforcement resources.112 One study reveals
substantial budgetary planning inefªciencies in areas such as salary
allocation for parliamentarians and hiring in various ministries.113
The creation of accountable civil service structures avoids such
inefªciencies, rendering funds available to assist Pakistan in establish-
ing more advisory institutions to complement those dedicated to en-
forcement.114 Employers stand to beneªt from advisory resources that
can aid them in better understanding and complying with labor legis-
lation.115
Secondly, the prominent issue of child labor must be addressed
with cognizance of the reality that child labor is viewed as a contribu-
tor to economic growth.116 Since both the government and employers
in developing nations lack incentives to comply with labor laws, legis-
lation designed to address the problem retroactively is largely ineffec-
tive. Pakistan should instead focus on policies aimed at eradicating
the root causes of child labor: adult unemployment and poverty.117
Conservative estimates place the unemployment rate at 7.7%, with
approximately one-third of the nation living in poverty.118
Research ªnds that in nations where child labor is a mass phe-
nomenon, as is overwhelmingly the case in developing nations, a
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child’s non-work is a luxury good in a household’s decision-making.119
Often, a family cannot reach even basic sustenance goals without
child income.120 Hence, if trade liberalization policies lead to a reduc-
tion in adult unemployment, parents will, on their own initiative,
withdraw children from the labor market.121 Moreover, these are long-
run goals, and must be implemented accordingly. The WTO’s social
clause does not currently account for such considerations relating to
child labor.122
Finally, making WTO trade liberalization commitments more fea-
sible for developing nations requires broader representation of their
interests in the decision-making process.123 In past WTO negotiations,
major decisions were left primarily to the European Union, the United
States, and a small number of other developed countries, despite the
fact that approximately 100 of the WTO’s members are developing na-
tions.124 Such marginalization reinforces the perception among devel-
oping nations that reforms set forth are simply an attempt to impose
protectionist barriers against their exports.125 This cynicism is particu-
larly prevalent in the area of labor reform, as “[e]ssentially all develop-
ing nations see low labor costs (and, perhaps, lax regulation of child
labor and working conditions and rights to organize) as an impor-
tant—perhaps their only—comparative advantage in attracting foreign
investment.”126 Meaningful inclusion of developing nations in WTO
negotiations will allow them to voice their unique constraints and to
develop attainable legal reform goals.127 One way to promote such
meaningful inclusion lies in effective consultation between WTO and
NGOs.128 As NGOs have a depth of experience in developing nations,
they can contribute valuable input in the design of viable legal reform
mechanisms.129
At the national level, Pakistan should leverage trade relationships
in the South Asian region to diversify its economy and decrease de-
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pendence on labor-intensive industries.130 Decreasing the country’s
overwhelming dependence on such industries will generate greater
incentive to comply with labor standards. Also, as Pakistani Chief Justice
Nazim Hussain Siddiqui has noted, the legal systems of South Asian
countries are confronted with common issues.131 As such, developing
nations of South Asia can use their respective strengths to synthesize
recommendations that adequately account for domestic conditions,
setting the stage for sustainable labor reform.132
Conclusion
As a developing nation member of the WTO, Pakistan confronts
the difªculties of developing viable legal mechanisms necessitated by
economic liberalization. In the face of pressure to implement labor
reforms incidental to trade liberalization policies, Pakistan’s unique
constraints as a developing nation dictate the need for feasible reform
expectations. By establishing a viable civil infrastructure, improving
the adult labor market, and garnering a broader participatory role in
the WTO, Pakistan holds potential to reap the rewards of economic
growth accompanied by lasting labor reform.
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